COGNITIVE NOISE, HERMENEUTICS, AND ARGUMENTATIVE PROCEDURES IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MANOEL MATOS AND MARIELLE FRANCO CASES

Abstract

This article analyzes the influence of cognitive noise in the judicial decision-making process and the role of legal hermeneutics and Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning in the rational variability of judicial decisions and judicial impartiality. It is based on the premise that judicial decision-making is not limited to the mechanical application of legal rules but constitutes an interpretive practice subject to cognitive and contextual factors. Initially, the study examines the principle of impartiality, understood not as absolute neutrality but as a requirement for the rational control of judicial conduct. It then presents a typology of decision-making noise, emphasizing level noise, pattern noise, and occasion noise, considering their relevance to understanding inconsistency in judicial judgments. Subsequently, judicial decision-making is analyzed through the lens of legal argumentation theory and the conception of law as a practice, drawing on Atienza (2014) and Lopes (2022), highlighting the role of justification in the formation of judicial conviction. Finally, a comparative analysis is conducted of the Incidents of Transfer of Jurisdiction (Incidentes de Deslocamento de Competência) in the Manoel Matos and Marielle Franco cases, regarding the hermeneutics of federalization adopted by Justice Laurita Vaz, without intending to attribute the decisions to the influence of any specific cognitive noise. The study concludes that the process of judicial decision-making is, in part, subject to the interpretive variability of law; however, mitigating cognitive noise requires strengthening the reasoning underlying judicial decisions, enhancing argumentative coherence, and reinforcing intersubjective review mechanisms, thereby ensuring greater consistency and legitimacy in the exercise of judicial authority.