LIMITS OF THE APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW

Abstract

The advancement of artificial intelligence in the legal field, particularly within the criminal justice system, calls for a critical reflection on its limits and implications in light of the fundamental principles of Criminal Law. This article aims to analyze the limits of the application of artificial intelligence in Criminal Law, arguing that granting decision-making capacity to algorithmic systems is incompatible with the humanizing and guarantee-based function of the penal system. This is a qualitative study of an exploratory nature, conducted through a bibliographic review based on doctrinal works, scientific articles, and specialized sources. The findings demonstrate that artificial intelligence, due to its lack of moral discernment and its reliance on historically conditioned data, tends to reproduce structural biases, thereby compromising fundamental principles such as human dignity, culpability, and proportionality. It is concluded that the use of artificial intelligence in Criminal Law should be restricted to instrumental support functions, particularly in data organization and analysis, and that its application in decision-making stages involving value judgments regarding individual freedom is incompatible, as it may violate the fundamental guarantees inherent to the Democratic Rule of Law.