SUPREMOCRACY: THE SUPREME FEDERAL COURT AND THE REDEFINITION OF THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL

Abstract

This article examines the Brazilian “supremocracy”—a term characterizing the expansion of the Supreme Federal Court’s (STF) authority within the constitutional framework established after 1988. It argues that the boundary between law and politics has not vanished but has instead shifted: conflicts once handled primarily within representative bodies have come to take the form of constitutional controversies. The study employs a literature review and a legal-institutional analysis of court decisions, selected based on their impact on fundamental rights, political competition, criminal jurisdiction, and public policy. The hypothesis is that the risks to the Court’s legitimacy stem not merely from the scope of its powers, but from a combination of individualized decision-making authority, control over the timing of proceedings, and deliberative shortcomings. The article concludes that collegiality, institutionally coherent legal reasoning, and inter-branch dialogue can mitigate these risks without compromising the judicial protection of fundamental rights.