DEMOCRATIC (UN)CERTAINTY: THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, AND ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT IN THE ROLE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS

Abstract

This article sought to analyze, from a conceptual standpoint, the relationship among judicialization of politics, judicial activism, and electoral governance, with particular attention to changes in electoral rules brought about through the action of high courts. The study was grounded in the literature of Political Science and Constitutional Law and took as its central analytical framework Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler’s account of electoral governance, especially the distinction among rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication. Methodologically, the article relied on bibliographic review and theoretical reconstruction of major authors in this field, including Tate and Vallinder, John Ferejohn, Luiz Werneck Vianna, Marcos Faro de Castro, and Vitor Marchetti, in order to conceptually delimit the three phenomena and identify their points of intersection. The analysis shows that judicialization of politics refers primarily to the institutional transfer of decision-making arenas to the judiciary, whereas judicial activism denotes an expansive interpretive posture adopted by judges. The article concludes that, in the electoral domain, high courts may, under the justification of adjudicating disputes, move beyond that function and effectively engage in rule-making, thereby reconfiguring electoral governance and altering the institutional structure of democratic competition.