SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT, LAY JUDGE, AND LIMITS OF AUTHORITY

Abstract

This article examines the role of the lay judge in Special Criminal Courts, focusing on the constitutional, legal, and procedural limits of such participation in criminal adjudication. It is based on the premise that the Special Courts system was designed to ensure speed, informality, procedural economy, and effective access to justice, without disregarding the fundamental guarantees inherent to criminal procedure. In this context, the study discusses the possibility of extending the powers of the lay judge to the criminal sphere, especially given the absence of express legal authorization in Law No. 9.099/1995. The research adopts a qualitative approach based on bibliographic review and normative and case law analysis. The findings show that, although the lay judge has an established role in Special Civil Courts, participation in criminal matters is subject to significant restrictions due to the principles of strict legality, jurisdictional reservation, due process of law, and the need to preserve the constitutional powers assigned to professional judges. It concludes that any participation of the lay judge in criminal matters must be exceptional and strictly limited, with no autonomous decision-making power.