JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the limits of judicial action, distinguishing legitimate constitutional adjudication from judicial activism and examining their effects on the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. Accordingly, the following research question is raised: Under what conditions does judicial activism serve to protect the constitutional order against the tyranny of the majority, and at what point does it become a counter-majoritarian veto that illegitimately shifts the locus of political decision-making to the Judiciary? Regarding the methodology, this is a theoretical, qualitative, exploratory, and explanatory study, conducted through bibliographical research and the deductive method, with a critical, interpretative, and comparative analysis of the main doctrinal perspectives on judicial activism and its relationship with the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. The study concludes that constitutional adjudication is legitimate when it protects the Constitution, fundamental rights, and the democratic process, but loses legitimacy when it unduly replaces the political choices of the representative branches of government, thereby undermining the separation of powers and constitutional democracy.