BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH: INTENTIONAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Abstract

This article examines defects of legislative initiative in the legislative process of the Federal District through an analytical framework that combines constitutional doctrine and institutional analysis, seeking to understand how norms that are formally incompatible with the Constitution may be consciously mobilized within legislative dynamics. It starts from the premise that the separation of powers is not merely an abstract formula of functional distribution, since it produces concrete effects on the design of the legislative process, especially when the Constitution reserves to the head of the Executive the power to initiate specific matters. Within this framework, the study investigates whether the persistence of district laws declared unconstitutional for defects of initiative can be explained only as technical error or whether, more precisely, it reveals a political rationality aimed at agenda appropriation, outsourcing of decision making costs, and redistribution of institutional responsibilities. The article brings together classic literature on the legislative process, reserved initiative, and judicial review with an examination of the role played by the Court of Justice of the Federal District and the Territories in the concentrated review of district norms, highlighting recurring argumentative patterns in decisions that recognize formal unconstitutionality. The central hypothesis is that the enactment of bills tainted by defects of initiative may function as a strategic device through which the Legislature signals political commitment, transfers the burden of implementation or veto to the Executive, and, in the event of judicialization, shifts to the Judiciary the institutional cost of invalidation while preserving symbolic gains before the electorate. The conclusion indicates that confronting this problem requires more than an abstract reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy, demanding improvements in preventive constitutional review, strengthening of parliamentary technical bodies, and greater institutional maturity in the relations among Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary within the Federal District.