LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND CONTRACTORS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LINDB, RISK ALLOCATION, AND ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL BALANCE

Abstract

This article analyzes the rationalization of administrative liability following the Brazilian Introduction to Norms of Brazilian Law (LINDB), focusing on the limits of control, gross negligence, and environmental risks in public bidding and contracts. It examines the relevance of Articles 27 and 28 of the LINDB in individualizing public agents’ responsibility, highlighting the need to assess the decision-making context, risk predictability, and practical consequences of administrative decisions. The study emphasizes the importance of the environmental risk matrix as a governance tool, capable of balancing responsibilities, preventing disputes, and protecting the contract’s economic-financial equilibrium, without exempting the duty to repair environmental damages. It also addresses the compatibility between contractor liability and the prevention of socio-environmental impacts, linking STJ case law, consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, and adherence to the principles of proportionality, legality, and legal certainty. The article concludes that rationalized administrative liability, combined with preventive risk allocation, strengthens efficiency, sustainability, and legal security in public procurement.