THE INAPLICABILITY OF THE IN DUBIO PRO SOCIETATE PRINCIPLE IN JURY COURT DECISIONS

Authors

  • Lívia Marinho Botelho Universidade de Gurupi – UnirG
  • Flávia Gonçalves Barros Dantas Universidade de Gurupi – UNIRG

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51891/rease.v9i10.11236

Keywords:

Inapplicability. Decisions. Principles. Rights.Society.

Abstract

This scientific article discusses the principle "in dubio pro societate" and its inapplicability in pronouncement decisions in the Jury Court. "In dubio pro societate" is a legal principle that implies that, in case of doubt, a decision must be made in favor of society, that is, in favor of criminal prosecution. This principle has historically been used to guarantee criminal prosecution and avoid impunity. The article examines case law and legal doctrine to highlight cases where excessive application of the "in dubio pro societate" principle has resulted in miscarriages of justice and violations of individual rights. The authors argue that it is necessary to find a balance between protecting society and guaranteeing the defendant's rights, especially in the early stages of the criminal process.

Author Biographies

Lívia Marinho Botelho, Universidade de Gurupi – UnirG

Graduanda do Curso de Direito na Universidade de Gurupi- UNIRG.

Flávia Gonçalves Barros Dantas, Universidade de Gurupi – UNIRG

Professora especialista e orientadora da Universidade de Gurupi – UNIRG. 

Published

2023-11-09

How to Cite

Botelho, L. M., & Dantas, F. G. B. (2023). THE INAPLICABILITY OF THE IN DUBIO PRO SOCIETATE PRINCIPLE IN JURY COURT DECISIONS. Revista Ibero-Americana De Humanidades, Ciências E Educação, 9(10), 1712–1721. https://doi.org/10.51891/rease.v9i10.11236