ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ITS POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON BRAZILIAN DEMOCRACY

Abstract

This study critically analyzes the organization and composition of the Brazilian Electoral Court, identifying historical and institutional weaknesses—such as the temporary status of judges, the accumulation of functions, and presidential influence in appointing lawyers—and assesses their effects on technical specialization, jurisprudential stability, and the credibility of the electoral process. Employing a doctrinal and historical‑institutional approach, the research examines constitutional provisions (arts. 118–121 of the 1988 Federal Constitution), the Electoral Code, TSE resolutions, jurisprudential precedents, and legislative proposals (notably PEC 31/2013), alongside a bibliographic review and analysis of technical notes and statements from entities such as AJUFE and the OAB. The study finds that a model originating in 1932 endures, producing three central problems: high turnover and temporary appointments that hinder expertise accumulation and foster jurisprudential instability; the accumulation of functions that undermines dedication and may compromise impartiality; and concentrated presidential appointment power, with limited civil‑society and legislative participation, which raises risks of political capture and reduces transparency. The paper proposes structural reforms—career electoral judiciary, separation of administrative and judicial functions, mandatory OAB participation in lawyer lists, and enhanced legislative oversight—to strengthen specialization, transparency, and legitimacy of the electoral system.