SEPARATION OF POWERS IN TIMES OF JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS

Abstract

The judicialization of politics strains the classic separation of powers and occupies a central position in contemporary Brazilian constitutionalism. This article investigates how the growing prominence of the Judiciary—especially the Supreme Federal Court—impacts the traditional boundaries of the functional tripartition that, since Montesquieu, has structured the state organization. The research adopts a qualitative methodology, based on a systematic bibliographic review of national and foreign works on separation of powers, constitutional jurisdiction, and judicial activism, as well as a jurisprudential analysis of paradigmatic decisions of the STF in matters of high political density. From this methodological approach, it seeks to address an essential dilemma: does judicial protagonism constitute illegitimate activism, with possible usurpation of powers democratically attributed to the representative branches, or does it constitute a legitimate exercise of the counter-majoritarian function aimed at the realization of fundamental rights and the preservation of constitutional supremacy? Contemporary pluralistic societies exhibit a high density of norms and moral conflicts that challenge classical models of rigid division of powers. In this scenario, a substantial reinterpretation of the principle of separation of powers is necessary, one capable of recognizing the legitimacy of constitutional jurisdiction as an instrument for the protection of rights, without disregarding the institutional risks arising from the expansion of decision-making power in bodies not subject to direct electoral scrutiny. The challenge lies in constructing a functional balance that preserves democracy and the normative force of the Constitution.