CONSIDERATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONALISM OF EXCEPTION IN THE LIGHT OF NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMS THEORY

Abstract

This article aims to analyze exceptional constitutionalism in postmodern societies in light of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, investigating its impacts on the autonomy of the legal system. Methodologically, it employs inference to the best explanation, combining bibliographic research and a qualitative approach, to identify the most appropriate theoretical model for understanding the observed phenomenon. The results show that the Constitution, conceived as an evolutionary acquisition and foundation of the legal system's validity, gradually loses its ability to mediate external irritations, being subjected to the direct influence of economic and financial agents. This dynamic characterizes structural decoupling, insofar as external disturbances are no longer processed autonomously and begin to generate immediate normative transformations. Exceptional constitutionalism, understood as a diffuse and permanent practice, breaks with the pillars of traditional constitutionalism, weakening fundamental rights, the welfare state, and the limiting function of the Constitution. It can be concluded that the contemporary model of exception is incompatible with Niklas Luhmann's theory, as it replaces structural coupling with a subjugation of the legal system to economic interests, compromising constitutional stability and normative autonomy.