FREEDOM OF JOURNALISTIC INFORMATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Abstract

The present work should present brief observations about the problem of freedom, focusing on freedom of journalistic information, in the philosophical spectrum. However, there is no intention of exhausting the topic in the theoretical scope as it is a subjective subject, generating philosophical and doctrinal controversies. It is not possible to glimpse an absolute truth or even present a final verdict due to conceptual heterogeneity. Therefore, I restrict myself to bringing a theoretical debate, also outlining general guidelines, the protection granted by the legal system regarding freedom of journalistic information, covering freedom of the press, the right to information, to search for information, to be informed, the right to criticism, freedom to express one's thoughts, abuses, excuses and the presumption of innocence. That said, this scientific work will analyze the relationship between freedom of journalistic information and the presumption of innocence, understanding the nuances of this relationship and how this interaction occurs in the spectrum of reality. Furthermore, it aims to analyze, through a real case, how theoretical applicability occurs in the practical sphere. The purpose of this essay is to explore whether freedom of information can be justified in light of the principle of presumption of innocence. After this essential premise, I tried to look into the problem: Does freedom of journalistic information generate the presumption of innocence? – which will be answered throughout this excerpt. In view of this scenario, the methodological procedure used in this scientific article was the bibliographic reference survey, as a basis, scientific literature, legislation, jurisprudence and doctrines were used.