PRINCIPLE IN DUBIO PRO REO: THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FACING PRISON IN THE SECOND INSTANCE

Authors

  • Antonieta Alves Vieira Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF
  • Iglesio Abreu Avelino Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF
  • Wberson Gomes de Araújo Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF
  • Jairo de Sousa Lima Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.51891/rease.v9i11.12569

Keywords:

Presumption of innocence. Provisional execution of the sentence. In doubt pro reo.

Abstract

The in dubio pro reo principle, with regard to the possibility of provisional execution of the criminal sentence pending an extraordinary and/or special appeal, in view of the principle of presumption of innocence, set out in art. 5th, item LVII, of the Federal Constitution, establishes that: "no one will be considered guilty until the conviction is reached." In this sense, the original objective of this work will be to verify whether compliance with the early execution, before the criminal sentence becomes final, would be violating constitutional dictates. The methodology for carrying out this work was a bibliographic survey in various sources, printed and digital, scientific articles and websites. especially jurisprudential research based on the Superior Courts database. This work explores the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, starting from a brief history of the principle of presumption of innocence in the first chapter, in the second chapter an overview of the current scenario of the provisional execution of the sentence for conviction in the second instance, and finally, in the third chapter, he provides a critical and conceptual approach to the arguments that the supreme court ministers used when deciding on the topic under analysis. Therefore, it is undeniable to state that the principle of presumption of innocence has not been relativized, and that it must necessarily be used in favor of every accused person in a criminal proceeding. Thus, it was found that the early execution of the sentence is not compatible with the Federal Constitution, therefore, while the rights provided for in the Constitution are in force, the execution of the sentence should not begin immediately after confirmation of the conviction in the second instance. . This is because it is preferable for a guilty person to avoid punishment than for an innocent person to be convicted of a crime they did not commit.

Author Biographies

Antonieta Alves Vieira, Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF

Acadêmica do Curso de Bacharelado em Direito pelo Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF.

Iglesio Abreu Avelino, Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF

Acadêmico do Curso de Bacharelado em Direito pelo Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF.

Wberson Gomes de Araújo, Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF

Acadêmico do do Curso de Bacharelado em Direito pelo Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF.

Jairo de Sousa Lima, Centro de Ensino Superior de Floriano – FAESF

Mestre em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Piauí. Especialista em Direito Penal e Processual Penal pela UniNovafapi. Orientador da pesquisa.

Published

2023-12-06

How to Cite

Vieira, A. A., Avelino, I. A., Araújo, W. G. de, & Lima, J. de S. (2023). PRINCIPLE IN DUBIO PRO REO: THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FACING PRISON IN THE SECOND INSTANCE. Revista Ibero-Americana De Humanidades, Ciências E Educação, 9(11), 1384–1400. https://doi.org/10.51891/rease.v9i11.12569